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The Downward Creep: An Overview of the AMT and Its
Expansion to the Middle Class
Michael D. Kim*
The AMT was first put in place in 1969 to ensure that the wealthiest
among us weren't able to find enough loopholes in the tax code to
avoid paying taxes entirely. But it has grown in the years since.
This year alone, it is threatening 23 million taxpayers, including
firefighters, teachers and others who were never intended to fall
under its grasp.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Alternative Minimum Tax's profile raised a once ob-
scure section of tax code to the forefront of media attention by threat-
ening to affect the lives of ordinary Americans. The Alternative
Minimum Tax ("AMT"), originally intended for the extraordinarily
wealthy, developed over time as a kind of second line of defense to
ensure taxpayers cannot overuse various incentive provisions to es-
cape paying a portion of their income to the federal government.2
However, the AMT will increasingly reach into the pool of middle-
income taxpayers over the next few years. "This is in large part due to
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, which significantly lowered tax rates, and
the lack of indexation of the AMT rate brackets and exemption
amount. ' 3 Taxpayers with incomes of less than $100,000 may account
for as many as 52% of the entire pool of AMT taxpayers in 2010, up
* J.D. and Certificate in Taxation, DePaul University College of Law, 2007; B.S., Northwest-
ern University, 2003. The author would like to acknowledge Professor Phillip Ashley for his
guidance and the endless support of KVG.
1. Charles B. Rangel, Stop the Middle-Class Tax Raid, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at A19.
2. Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending the AMT (And
Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REv. 811, 813 (2004).
3. Id. at 814.
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from about 9% in 2003. 4 In 2007, approximately 23 million households
may face the AMT-about 19 million of them for the first time.5
The increase in taxpayers subject to the AMT creates a dilemma-
the longer Congress waits to limit the scope of the AMT, the more it
will cost to do so. It has been projected to cost more to repeal the
AMT in 2008 than it would cost at that time to repeal the regular
income tax.6
No clear solution exists to solve this AMT predicament. Regular tax
repeal would further benefit taxpayers at the very highest income
brackets, who now pay regular tax at high marginal rates compared to
the AMT. 7 Alternatively, AMT repeal is strongly urged by a number
of commentators. They note the "stealth" nature of the AMT,
whereby many ordinary taxpayers are unaware of its existence or the
relationship among its various provisions. 8
Another clear problem is the lack of consistency with regular in-
come tax policy. For instance, the AMT conflicts with and abrogates
benefits of specific provisions targeted by Congress for particular tax
statuses, such as the state tax or medical expense deductions. Addi-
tionally, the complexity of multiple computations to determine tax lia-
bility and the internal complexity of the AMT provisions themselves
clearly add to taxpayer confusion.
Those arguments, however, ignore the negative aspects of AMT re-
peal. When one accounts for the significant tax reductions wealthy
taxpayers enjoy under the current federal tax scheme (including the
decrease in taxation of capital gains and dividends, as well as the likely
permanent reduction or elimination of estate taxes), it is apparent that
a method to capture upper-bracket taxpayers is necessary. A repeal of
the AMT would cause further problems for ordinary taxpayers be-
cause lost revenue would need to be offset with future tax increases or
a reduction in benefits. At a time when there is significant and increas-
ing disparity of incomes among taxpayers, AMT repeal would destroy
one of the only ways the Internal Revenue Service has to snare high
4. Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105, 105
(2003). The government predicts that 51.3 million taxpayers will pay increased taxes due to the
AMT by 2015. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFF. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: THE TOLL OF
Two TAXES: THE REGULAR INCOME TAX AND THE AMT (Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/factsheet-thetolloftwotaxesupdate.pdf.
5. Jeanne Sahadi, AMT: Tick-tock, Congress, CNNMONEY, Sept. 24, 2007, http://money.cnn.
com/2007/09/24/pf/taxes/amtticktock/index.htm.
6. Burman et al., supra note 4, at 106.
7. Beale, supra note 2, at 814.
8. David Cay Johnston, Your Taxes: A 'Stealth Tax' Is Creeping Up on Growing Numbers of
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at 17.
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income taxpayers adept at tax avoidance. As one scholar has
observed:
Even prior to the 2002-2003 tax cuts, analysts noted that the benefit
of AMT repeal would accrue to higher-income households: "the av-
erage tax cut for all households with income above $200,000
[roughly 3% of taxpayers] would rise by $11,000." AMT repeal
would thus exacerbate the trend that is shifting the overall federal
tax burden away from high-income taxpayers. 9
Before one can attempt to repair the current AMT predicament, we
will have to explore the problem and its background. Part II surveys
the history of the AMT.10 Part III defines the current state of the
AMT, including its calculation and the problems it imposes to taxpay-
ers.1 Part IV outlines various proposals for reform, 12 with Part V de-
tailing current legislative proposals. 13 Overall, it is clear that Congress
did not intend to impose the AMT on the middle-class, and steps must
be taken to remedy the situation before it becomes an even larger
burden.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX
A. The 1969 Add-on Minimum Tax and Predecessor to the
Alternative Minimum Tax
The AMT has its roots in 1967 when 155 individuals with an ad-
justed gross income over $200,000 and 21 individuals with gross in-
come over $1,000,000 paid no federal income tax.14 Then, like today,
the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") contained many tax breaks that
functioned as economic incentives to encourage some and discourage
other taxpayer behaviors. 15 A number of wealthy individuals and tax
professionals took extreme advantage of these tax "loopholes," which
resulted in minute tax liability relative to their income.1 6 Such legal
tax avoidance seemed inequitable to lawmakers, and many feared that
9. Beale, supra note 2, at 815 (citing William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic
Evaluation of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT'L TAX J.
133, 149 (2002)).
10. See infra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 44-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 140-63 and accompanying text.
14. Brian L. O'Shaughnessy, The Growing Need for an Alternative to the AMT, 16 KAN. J.L.
& Pun. POL'Y 67, 69 (2006) (citing Hearings on the Econ. Report of the President Before the Joint
Econ. Comm., 91st Cong. 5-6 (1969) (statement of Secretary of Treasury Joseph W. Barr)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
2008]
454 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
this inequality would adversely affect individual taxpayer compliance,
crucial to the American self-reporting tax scheme. 17
Congress responded with the enactment of an add-on minimum tax
in 196918 which, according to one scholar:
[I]ntended to defend against the ability of the superrich to avoid a
fair share of the federal tax burden through "extreme concentra-
tions of tax incentives." Congress considered it "intolerable" that
"taxpayers with substantial incomes have found ways of gaining tax
advantages from provisions placed in the code primarily to aid some
limited segment of the economy." 19
The relatively straightforward system required an add-on tax equal
to ten percent of the amount, if any, to which the taxpayer's tax pref-
erences exceeded $30,000.20 This amount was added to the taxpayer's
regular income tax liability to determine his total income tax liability.
Aside from one rate increase to 15% in 1976,21 the add-on minimum
tax remained relatively unchanged until 1982.22
The add-on minimum tax was expected to reach about one in
500,000 taxpayers, those with incomes of at least $200,000 (more than
$1 million in 2004 dollars). 23 As explained in the legislative history of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act:
[T]he minimum tax should serve one overriding objective: to ensure
that no taxpayer with substantial economic income can avoid signifi-
cant tax liability by using exclusions, deductions, and credits. Al-
though these provisions may provide incentives for worthy goals,
they become counterproductive when taxpayers are allowed to use
them to avoid virtually all tax liability. The ability of high-income
individuals .. .to pay little or no tax undermines respect for the
17. R. Jason Griffin, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: Is It Touching People that It
Shouldn't Be?, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 259, 261-62 (2004) (stating that in 1969, members of
Congress received more letters of protest concerning the 155 taxpayers than letters of protest
concerning the Vietnam War).
18. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 69 (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 56, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, 83 Stat. 487, 580 (1969)).
19. Beale, supra note 2, at 843 (citing Glenn E. Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving
Again that Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1980) & H.R. REP.
No. 91-413, at 1 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200).
20. Stewart S. Karlinsky, A Report on Reforming the Alternative Minimum Tax System, 12 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 139, 141-42 (1995).
21. Id. at 142 (citing Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 301, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1529,1549-54
(1976)) (amending I.R.C. § 56(a)).
22. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 56 as enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 301, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
83 Stat. 487, 580-81 (1969); I.R.C. § 56 as amended in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 301, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1529, 1549-54 (1976); I.R.C. § 55 as enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1978,
§ 421, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2871, 2871-72 (1978)).
23. See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX FOR
INDIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN (Kurt Schuler, Comm. Print 2001), available at http:I
www.house.gov/jec/tax/amt.pdf.
[Vol. 6:451
THE DOWNWARD CREEP
entire tax system .... [E]ven aside from public perceptions, . . . it is
inherently unfair for high-income individuals ... to pay little or no
tax due to their ability to utilize various tax preferences.2 4
B. The 1979 Alternative Minimum Tax
The AMT's current incarnation originated with the Revenue Act of
1978 and the revision of Section 55 of the Code. According to Brian
O'Shaughnessy, "unlike the add-on minimum tax, the AMT is an en-
tirely separate tax system"-a parallel tax with its own base and rate
schedules and separate exemption amount.25 O'Shaughnessy further
asserted, "From 1979 to 1982, the high-income taxpayer would com-
pute his minimum tax using three systems: the regular tax, the AMT,
and the add-on minimum tax. The greatest of the three tax liabilities
determined the amount owed."'2 6 In 1982, Congress revised the 1979
AMT and removed the 1969 add-on tax27 via the Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act ("TEFRA").28 The 1983 version of the AMT
was "far simpler and more administrable than the current system, '29
since it did not yet incorporate the "parallel world" concept found
today. 30 The 1983 AMT was calculated by imposing a twenty percent
tax on the excess, if any, of Alternative Minimum Taxable Income
("AMTI") over regular taxable income.31 "The AMT created under
TEFRA lasted from 1984 to 1986."32
C. The 1986 Alternative Minimum Tax
The 1986 Code massively overhauled the federal tax system and
among the changes, a new AMT was enacted.3 3 The 1986 AMT was
arguably a fairer tax, but the trade-off was simplicity. The 1986 AMT
incorporated three new concepts: "the 10 percent minimum tax or
24. Beale, supra note 2, at 843 (citing S. REP. No. 99-313, at 518-19 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3
C.B. 3).
25. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 69.
26. Id. at 69-70 (citing I.R.C. § 55 (West 1981)).
27. Id. at 70 (citing Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility of 1982, § 201, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324, 411-21 (1982)).
28. Id.
29. Karlinsky, supra note 20, at 144.
30. Id.
31. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 70 n.25 ("AMTI was determined by reducing the tax-
payer's adjusted gross income (AGI) by the aggregate of: the alternative tax net operating loss
deduction, the alternative tax itemized deductions, and any other amount included in income
under I.R.C. § 667 (1983); then increasing that number by the amount of items of tax
preference.").
32. Id. at 70.
33. Id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 701, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2320-45
(1986)).
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floor concept, the prepayment concept, and the parallel world
concept. '34
The "floor" concept created a 10% tax floor below which a taxpayer
affected by the AMT may not reduce his tax liability. "This is accom-
plished through the 90 percent limitations on net operating losses in
section 56(d)(1) and on foreign tax credits in section 59(a)(2). ''35 As
one commentator noted:
The prepayment concept allows the taxpayer to use his minimum
tax credit to offset future regular tax liability with AMT paid-for
deferral items. For example, suppose that an individual exercises an
incentive stock option (ISO) creating an AMT liability of $10,000
greater than his regular tax liability. If in a subsequent year that
same taxpayer's regular tax liability would be greater than his AMT
liability, the $10,000 AMT previously paid may be used as a credit
against his regular tax liability in that subsequent year.
The third concept is that of the parallel world. The 1986 Code
effectively creates three separate tax systems: the regular tax, the
AMT, and the adjusted current earnings (ACE) component of the
AMT. As an example, depreciation of an asset must be calculated
separately for regular tax and for the AMT. A third system of de-
preciation must be considered for ACE if the asset was placed in
service before 1994. Additionally, the taxpayer must calculate a dif-
ferent basis in the asset for each of the systems. When the asset is
sold or exchanged, the character of the gain or loss may be different
when calculated under the three systems. Thus, the impact on capi-
tal gains or losses under each system may also be different.
In 2001, Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act.36
Commonly known as the "Bush tax cuts," the Act made no changes to
the AMT system.
D. The Expansion of the AMT
Perhaps the most contentious result of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts is
the impending applicability of the individual AMT to many ordinary
taxpayers. 37 Simply put, lowering the regular tax rates while leaving
the AMT rates as they were prior to the tax cuts (applying on a
34. Karlinsky, supra note 20, at 146.
35. Id.
36. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 70-71.
37. Amy Feldman, The Tax of Unintended Consequences, MONEY, Sept. 1, 2003, at 86
("[M]uch of what the government gave with the regular income tax breaks, it will soon take
away with the alternative minimum tax."); Shawn Tully, Taxpayer, Beware! Washington Will
Soon Be Taking Back a Good Chunk of That New Tax Cut. How? By Using the Sneakiest Trap
It's Got: The Alternative Minimum Tax, FORTUNE, June 23, 2003, at 48 (noting that the 2001 tax
cut lowered marginal rates and reduced net capital gains taxes, but had "the perverse effect of
throwing far more people into the AMT").
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broader AMT base) ensures that the AMT will require more taxpay-
ers to pay additional tax compared to their regular tax computation.
As Professor Beale has noted:
Although the AMT originally targeted tax-avoidance possibilities
of the superrich (e.g., the net capital gain exclusion) and thus af-
fected "less than 1 percent [of taxpayers] in any year before 2000,"
the individual AMT is now poised to affect a much broader group
of taxpayers. This is in part because the AMT exemption amount
and rate brackets are not indexed to inflation, but even more be-
cause the regular income tax cuts are not matched by similar perma-
nent cuts in the AMT. The AMT is projected to affect
approximately 29 million taxpayers in 2010, up from 3 million in
2004. A quirk of the interrelationship between the tax cuts and the
AMT is that the AMT will gradually eliminate the benefit of the tax
cuts for middle income taxpayers on the upper end of the scale -
what one commentator calls the AMT "take-backs." A 2003 statisti-
cal analysis by Burman, Gale and Rohaly at the Urban Institute
suggested that by 2010 the AMT would eliminate 70% of the tax cut
for taxpayers with gross income between $100,000 and $500,000 and
42% of the tax cut for taxpayers with gross income between $75,000
and $100,000. A more recent study suggests that 97% of taxpayers
with two children and incomes of $75,000 to $100,000 will be af-
fected by the AMT by 2010, and 44 million will be affected by 2014.
Congress has not acted to deal comprehensively with the interac-
tion of the regular tax cuts and the AMT. Instead, it has passed
annual [stop gap] fixes[, or "patches,"] that increase the AMT ex-
emption to prevent, for the few years during which the patch is ap-
plicable, [AMT encroachment on] the vast majority of middle-
income and unintended taxpayers from having to pay the tax.
Congress' [sic] failure to do more is due to the enormous costs of
simultaneously making the tax cuts permanent and eliminating the
extended reach of the AMT into lower tax brackets. The Congres-
sional Budget Office has estimated that full AMT repeal would re-
duce tax revenues by roughly $600 billion over ten years, even
assuming that the 2001-2003 tax cut sunsets take effect as planned.
[Scholars] estimate that indexing the AMT under current law would
cost $428 billion, while the combined cost of indexing the AMT and
making the tax cuts permanent would be $1.76 trillion. Even repeal
advocates such as the National Taxpayers Union admit it could cost
as much as $800 billion over ten years to repeal the AMT and make
the 2001-2003 tax cuts permanent. These estimates make clear that
the cost of repeal would be significant, and that cost will be substan-
tially increased if the 2001-2003 tax cuts are made permanent. Full
repeal would, of course, have other implications for the overall fed-
eral tax system, especially for progressivity. Congress' [sic] ap-
proach has therefore been one of piecemeal reform to prevent the
2008]
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worst combined effects of the AMT and new tax cuts while "post-
poning hard choices."
'38
Most recently, a patch was passed at the 11th hour for 2007 (on
December 20, 2007), aimed to minimize the impact of the AMT.39
Since 2001, Congress temporarily increased income exemption levels
and allowed some personal credits to be used. 40 The 2006 patch put
the exemption levels at $62,550 for joint filers and $42,250 for single
filers. 41 Without the 2007 patch, the 2007 exemption amounts would
have fallen to $45,000 for joint filers and $33,750 for single filers.42
Despite the 2007 patch, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
that 5.4 million tax filers are likely subject to the AMT in 2007, up
from around 4 million last year.43
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX
A. Calculation of the Alternative Minimum Tax
The current alternative minimum tax ("AMT") is a "back-up" tax
system with flatter rate brackets and a broader tax base than the regu-
lar income tax. 44 The base (AMTI) is derived from the regular income
tax base by making certain "adjustments" and adding back in certain
"preference" items that are disallowed for AMT purposes.45 These ad-
justments and disallowed tax preferences ("AMT preferences") in-
38. Beale, supra note 2, at 845-47 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., REVENUE AND TAX POLICY
BRIEF No. 4, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1 (2004), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/53xx/
doc5368/04-15-AMT.pdf; Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale & Peter Orszag, Bush Administra-
tion Tax Policy: Introduction and Background, 104 TAX NOTES 1291, 1294 (2004); Nina E. Olson,
2004 Annual Report to Congress, NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Dec. 31, 2004, at 383; Al Davis,
New Household Tax Cuts are Strongly Affected by AMT and Vary Over Time, 92 TAX NOTES, 293
(2001); Robert S. McIntyre, Bush's Most-Favored Taxpayers, AM. PROSPECT, July 1, 2002, at 17;
Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, The AMT: Projections and Problems,
100 TAX NOTES 105, 105 (2003); Leonard E. Burman et al., AMT Relief in the FY2005 Budget: A
Bandaid for a Hemorrhage, Feb. 4, 2004, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000601.pdf). See
also Dustin Stamper, House Clears 'Tax Cut of the Week' - A Short-Term AMT Fix, 103 TAX
NOTES 625 (2004); William L. Watts, Timing Uncertain on Major Tax Overhaul, MARKETWATCH,
Oct. 17, 2007; Floyd Norris, Help Grandparents of Rich Kids Now, Deal with Real Problems
Later, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at C1 (noting the Bush administration does not seem "eager to
deal with the prospect of the alternative minimum tax . . . harming many middle-class
taxpayers").
39. Jeanne Sahadi, One-Year AMT Fix a Done Deal, CNNMONEY, Dec. 20, 2007, http://
money.cnn.com/2007/12/19/pfltaxes/amt-votewalkup/index.htm.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Sahadi, supra note 5.
43. Id.
44. I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (2006).
45. Id. § 55(b)(2) (requiring adjustments and disallowing tax preference items); id. § 56 (set-
ting out adjustments); id. § 57 (listing tax preference items).
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clude such items as a reduction in the amount of accelerated
depreciation that may be taken into account for AMT purposes, the
disallowance of the deduction for interest on certain home equity
loans, and required inclusion of otherwise excluded tax-exempt inter-
est on certain private activity bonds.4 6
The AMT creates a unique tax that is parallel to the regular tax.
Calculation of the AMT begins with the calculation of one's income
tax liability under the regular system.4 7 That amount is then sub-
tracted from the individual taxpayer's tentative minimum tax to calcu-
late AMT tax liability.48
The tentative minimum tax is the sum of "26 percent of so much of
the taxable excess as does not exceed $175,000, plus 28 percent of so
much of the taxable excess as exceeds $175,000. ' '49 Taxable excess is
that amount of the taxpayer's AMTI for the taxable year "as exceeds
the exemption amount. '50
The taxpayer's AMTI is his regular taxable income reduced or in-
creased by adjustments provided in Code Sections 56 and 58, and in-
creased by tax preference items found in Code Section 57.51
Adjustments and preferences found in Code Sections 57 to 58 "can be
categorized into two groups: deferral and exemption provisions. '52
The exemption provisions are relatively simple, requiring that the tax-
payer add back exemptions by which the regular income tax was re-
duced. 53 Deferral provisions are considerably more difficult as they
require the taxpayer to recalculate income and costs using different
schedules that that used to calculate regular income tax liability.54
Finally, the exemption amount-the amount by which the AMTI is
reduced before applying one of the two tentative minimum tax brack-
ets-is $44,350 for a single individual and $66,550 for married taxpay-
ers filing joint returns or for a surviving spouse.55
46. Id. §§ 56(a)(1), 56(e), 57(a)(5).
47. Income tax liability under the regular tax system is calculated by applying the tax rates
found at I.R.C. § 1 against the individual taxpayer's taxable income. Taxable income is calcu-
lated as the individual taxpayer's gross income defined at I.R.C. § 61, less deductions defined at
I.R.C. § 63.
48. I.R.C. § 55(a)(1) (2006).
49. Id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i).
50. Id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(ii).
51. Id. § 55(b)(2).
52. Griffin, supra note 17, at 266.
53. I.R.C. § 57.
54. Griffin, supra note 17, at 267.
55. I.R.C. § 55(d)(1) (2006).
2008]
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B. Problems with the Current Alternative Minimum Tax
1. Overview-Classical Approach
Adam Smith's "canons of taxation" provides one framework to ana-
lyze the problems with the current AMT. Smith believed:
[T]axes should be levied in proportion to the respective financial
abilities of the taxpayers ("fairness")[,] . . . be certain and predict-
able ("stability")[,] ... be made convenient for the taxpayer ("eco-
nomic efficiency")[, and] . . . be levied in a manner that takes as
little out of the pockets of the taxpayer as possible in relation to the
actual amount of revenue the state receives by way of taxation ("ad-
ministrative efficiency"). 56
First, the fairness of the AMT comes into question as AMT tax lia-
bility begins to fall onto the middle class taxpayers. For instance, in
2000, only 1.1 million taxpayers were subject to the AMT. 57 By 2010,
the AMT will reach 7.6 million taxpayers.5 8 To compound this prob-
lem, the AMT has only two tax brackets, and it lacks the progressivity
of the regular tax.59 In effect, a larger burden of taxation will fall on
the middle class and tax rates will peak for those with income in the
range of $200,000 to $500,000.60 If unabated, the United States may
well return to a time where the superrich pay a miniscule amount of
tax relative to their income, a situation which led to the public outcry
resulting in the first add-on or alternative minimum tax in 1969.61
Other inequities encountered through the AMT are attributable, in
part, to the limitations on deductions.62 For example, a taxpayer's cal-
culated AMTI disallows certain miscellaneous itemized deductions. 63
One such deduction is that for state and local taxes.64 This means tax-
payers in states with high income, property, and sales taxes who would
normally claim a deduction for state and local sales tax on their regu-
lar tax return cannot claim such deduction against the AMT. This in-
56. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 74, as reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 361-62 (Robert Hutchins ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1986) (citing ADAM
SMITH, AN INOUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND THE CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)).
57. Robert Rebelein & Jerry Tempalski, Who Pays the Individual AMT? 19 tbl.1 (U.S. Trea-
sury Dep't, OTA Papers, Paper No. 1, June 2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/
tax-policy/library/ota87.pdf.
58. Id.
59. The regular tax has six tax brackets ranging from 10 percent to 35 percent in an attempt to
shift the tax burden progressively onto those with greater income. The goal of progressiveness
has long been a hallmark of the federal tax system.
60. Griffin, supra note 17, at 260.
61. See id. at 260-61.
62. See generally I.R.C. § 56 (2006).
63. Id. § 67(b).
64. See id. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (prohibiting miscellaneous itemized deductions as defined in
I.R.C. § 67(b)). See also id. §§ 67(b)(2), 164(b)(2).
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equity hurts not only by the individual taxpayer, but also the state
whose citizens' financial abilities are reduced as they lose deductions.
Further, citizens of a state will likely be more resistant to a state's
attempt to raise taxes, as fewer of the state's citizens may claim that
tax as a deduction against their federal tax.
Additionally, the AMT exemption for couples is less than double
the exemption for singles. 65 Unlike the regular tax system, the AMT
does not have a separate set of tax brackets for marital status. 66 Thus
"the AMT imposes significant marriage penalties. 67
Stability becomes a more important consideration as more taxpay-
ers become familiar with and are affected by the AMT. Taxpayers'
uncertainty grows as the AMT's existence and proposals for reform
are proposed and debated upon without resolution. Even without
comprehensive reform, the AMT exclusion amount must periodically
be adjusted via annual patches and without an index for inflation or a
set schedule for adjustment, taxpayers have no idea when the next
adjustment will be pushed through Congress. 68
Economic efficiency is compromised when a tax is imposed without
a taxpayer realizing any financial gain.69 Many taxpayers find them-
selves subject to the AMT without ever realizing the income consid-
ered in calculating the AMTI.
Next, administrative efficiency is directly related to simplicity. The
AMT, however, is notoriously complex. 70 The AMT's complexity re-
sults in increased costs to taxpayers and the IRS in its compliance and
enforcement. Additionally, the complexity of AMT calculation virtu-
ally requires taxpayers to enlist the help of tax professionals and other
preparation resources. Since the cost of tax advice is out of the reach
of most average Americans, wealthy taxpayers have more opportuni-
65. Id. § 55(d)(1)(A)-(B) (prescribing $33,750 as the exemption amount for non-married tax-
payers and $45,000 as the exemption amount for married taxpayers); see also Leonard E. Bur-
man, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, The Expanding Reach of the Individual Alternative
Minimum Tax, 17(2) J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 174-75 (2003).
66. Burman et al., supra note 66, at 175.
67. Id.
68. See I.R.C. § 55(d)(1)(A) (2006 and Supp. 2007) (concerning an increase in the exemption
amount for taxable years beginning in 2006).
69. Id. § 1001(b) ("[T]he amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money)
received.").
70. Jeffrey Rohaly, Leonard E. Burman & Matthew Hall, Key Points on the Alternative Mini-
mum Tax, BROOKINGS, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/gale/20040121amt.
htm ("[T]he Internal Revenue Service and the Taxpayer Advocate have flagged the AMT as one
of the most complicated tax provisions to comply with and administer. Most people required to
fill out the AMT forms end up owing no additional taxes. The AMT also creates complicated
interactions with the regular income tax.").
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ties to manipulate tax laws, adding to actual and perceived inequity
between the rich and the poor. Finally, as tax computations become
more complicated, there is simply a higher chance that mistakes will
be made by a taxpayer that undertakes AMT calculations alone.
The costs of compliance are not bourn by the taxpayer alone. The
IRS itself will incur much of the cost of providing for taxpayer assis-
tance and in the clear costs of auditing taxpayers facing the AMT,
further reducing administrative efficiency.
Finally, another immense problem with the AMT is that it will be-
come increasingly more expensive to roll back or repeal the tax as the
AMT tax base snowballs every new year. By 2008, a repeal of the
AMT would cost more than a repeal of the regular tax.71
2. Specific Issues
Within Smith's framework, we can focus in on the main criticisms
faced today with the AMT.
Calls for AMT reform or repeal are not new, as the debate began
soon after the 1978 enactment of the current version of the add-on
tax. As early as 1980, commentators recognized the need to address
excessive tax avoidance by high-income taxpayers as an important
way to improve the overall equity of and compliance with the tax sys-
tem, but argued that the AMT was "ill-conceived in every respect"
because of its cumbersomeness and inequitable application. 72 They ar-
gued that Congress could have achieved the same (or better) results
through less cumbersome fine-tuning of the regular tax system.73 The
same thoughts are echoed today and evidenced by a recent report of
the National Taxpayer Advocate that considers the AMT one of the
most serious problems taxpayers face and labels AMT repeal a "Key
Legislative Recommendation. ' 74
According to Linda Beale:
Critics attack the AMT on five main grounds: (i) its failure to ade-
quately target the superrich and instead to take back the tax cuts
from middle- and upper-income taxpayers (the downward creep ar-
gument); (ii) its lack of transparency for ordinary taxpayers who are
often inadequately informed (if not totally unaware) of the poten-
tial applicability of the AMT to their situation (the transparency ar-
71. Burman, supra note 4, at 106.
72. Glenn E. Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving Again that Two Wrongs Do Not
Make a Right, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1093. 1094 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1 (1969), reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. 200.
73. See, e.g., Coven, supra note 73, at 1108.
74. See Nina E. Olson, 2004 Annual Report to Congress, NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Dec. 31,
2004, at 3.
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gument); (iii) its lack of consistency with regular income tax policy
(the consistency argument); (iv) its addition of a layer of complexity,
both in terms of the initial determination of whether the AMT may
be applicable and the particular mechanisms of AMT applicability
(the complexity argument), and (v) its apprehension of taxpayers
with various kinds of lump sum payments, such as stock options and
contingent attorney fee awards (the "accidental taxpayer"
argument).75
Many of these arguments overlap and interconnect. For instance,
the complexity of the AMT contributes to the lack of transparency.
Additionally, some of the arguments are directly targeted at the cur-
rent structure of the AMT, while others are general concerns about
fairness for AMT taxpayers.
The following Sub-subsections address the three strongest argu-
ments against the AMT: (a) the downward creep of the tax, (b) the
lack of transparency, and (c) the overwhelming complexity of the
AMT.
a. Downward Creep
Arguments made about the downward creep of the AMT are based
on the original purpose of the tax. The downward creep of the AMT
into the middle class is inconsistent with the original purpose of a min-
imum tax-that is, capturing revenue from high income taxpayers who
would otherwise avoid their share of tax liability. Although the
AMT's failure to be indexed with inflation is a major cause of the
AMT's expanding reach, it can also be argued that it simply is not
capturing enough high-income taxpayers. This Sub-subsection ex-
plores those arguments.
Many have criticized the AMT, noting:
The AMT's lack of an indexation [for inflation] is widely con-
ceded as a flaw across the political spectrum. In 2005, the Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center and the Treasury Department esti-
mated that around 15% of households with incomes between
$75,000 and $100,000 must pay the AMT, up from only 2-3% in
2000, with the percentage increasing at high incomes. That percent-
age is set to increase quickly over the coming years if no change is
made such as indexing for inflation. Currently, households with in-
comes below $75,000 are subject to the AMT only very rarely (and
thus most tax advisors do not recommend computing AMT for such
households). That is set to change in only a few years, however, if
the AMT remains unindexed.
The median household income in the United States was $44,389
in 2005, and households making over $75,000 per year made up the
75. Beale, supra note 2, at 848.
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top quartile of household incomes. Because those are the house-
holds generally required to compute the AMT (though only a frac-
tion currently have to pay), some argue that the AMT still hits only
the wealthy or the upper middle class. However, some counties,
such as Fairfax County, VA ($100,318), and some cities, such as San
Jose, CA ($71,765), have local median incomes that are considera-
bly higher than the national median and approach or exceed the
typical AMT threshold. The cost-of-living index is generally higher
in such areas, which leads to families who are "middle class" in that
area having to pay the AMT, while in poorer locales with lower
costs of living, only the "locally wealthy" pay the AMT. In other
words, many who pay the AMT have incomes that would place
them among the wealthy when considering the United States as a
whole, but who think of themselves as "middle class" because they
are not wealthy due to the cost of living in their locale. 7
6
Today, the AMT fails to achieve its original purpose of ensuring
that the wealthiest taxpayers pay some federal income tax.77 As de-
scribed above, when the original minimum tax legislation was enacted,
Congress focused on the ability of 154 individuals with adjusted gross
incomes exceeding $200,000 to pay no 1966 income tax at all. 78 The
AMT was designed to limit very high income taxpayers' use of a few
preferences that could literally wipe out their tax liability in spite of
their considerable economic income, resulting in an unfair sharing of
the tax burden. 79 Congress made further changes in 1976, again react-
ing to a study that indicated 244 high-income taxpayers paid no tax in
1974, even with the AMT system in place.80
Despite of all the tailoring of the AMT to capture high-income tax
avoiders, many argue the AMT has not succeeded in capturing those
targeted. One calculation indicates the AMT system adds about one
high-income taxpayer for every 1,000 high-income taxpayers already
paying some amount of income tax under the regular tax system.81
Since the AMT appears to be missing its mark, critics argue that a
76. Wikipedia.org, Alternative Minimum Tax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AlternativeMini-
mumTax (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
77. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 75, at 383 ("While the AMT was originally designed to prevent
wealthy taxpayers from escaping tax liability through the use of tax avoidance transactions, it
now affects large groups of middle-class taxpayers with no tax avoidance motives at all.").
78. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200.
79. Id. at 234 ("[O]nly by sharing the tax burden on a fair basis is it possible to keep the tax
burden at a level which is tolerable for all taxpayers").
80. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX FOR IN-
DIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN 5 (Kurt Schuler, Comm. Print 2001), available at http://
www.house.gov/jec/tax/amt.pdf.
81. Id. at 6-8 (using 1998 return numbers and results of a 2001 GAO study to calculate these
numbers).
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more efficient way to deal with high-income tax evaders is to simplify
the tax code and reduce taxes. 82
Although the AMT is clearly not the best way to ensure high-in-
come taxpayers pay at least some tax, it can be argued that the AMT
still does manage to trap some and repealing the AMT will result in
some taxpayers owing nominal or no tax. In 2003, about 2,700 taxpay-
ers with incomes more than $1 million who would not otherwise have
paid any tax were caught by the AMT.83 This number is not insignifi-
cant, especially if one considers the deterrent effect of the AMT.
Without an AMT system, considerably larger numbers of high-income
taxpayers might engage in aggressive tax-avoidance planning around
the very items currently made difficult to use in tax sheltering because
of the AMT.84
The primary reason the failure of purpose justification of the down-
ward creep argument raised is the increasing encroachment of the
AMT on middle class taxpayers. One reason for the expanding scope
of the AMT is the constant change in the treatment of preference
items under the AMT by Congress since the original alternative tax's
enactment. According to Beale:
The original AMT focused on deductions that might be taken by
owners of property, a group that we have seen can be expected to
be made up predominantly of the wealthy .... Thus, AMT prefer-
ences under the 1969 legislation included the portion of net capital
gains excluded under the pre-1986 Code regular tax and excess de-
preciation or amortization deductions permitted under the regular
tax. The 1976 amendments, however, added a tax preference for
itemized deductions, essentially limiting itemized deductions other
than medical and casualty losses to no more than 60% of adjusted
gross income. Further amendments over the years, in 1986, 1993,
and 1997, eliminated some of the preferences that could be ex-
pected to be used predominantly by the very wealthy (e.g., the ulti-
mately short-lived AMT preference for untaxed appreciation on
charitable deductions). The amendments, while providing a specific
ability-to-pay exemption amount for AMT purposes, also resulted
in treating as AMT preferences a number of items that we think of,
at least in part, as ability-to-pay exemptions - the standard deduc-
tion, miscellaneous itemized deductions, state and local tax deduc-
tions, a larger portion of medical expenses, and various credits. 8 5
82. Id. at 14.
83. Burman, supra note 4, at 106.
84. David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist, THE CONTRARIAN REVIEW, Dec. 21, 2003,
htp://www.contrarianreview.com/helping.html (quoting tax lawyer Jonathan Blattmachr of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, who said, "There are lots of things you would not even
think about because of the alternative minimum tax,... [blut if you repeal it, then there are all
sorts of things to start thinking about.").
85. Beale, supra note 2, at 850 (citing I.R.C. § 56).
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All in all, the widening reach of the AMT cannot be disputed; how-
ever, the policy justifications for retaining the AMT remain a topic for
debate.
b. Transparency
A self-assessment tax system, like the one in the United States, re-
lies upon a taxpayer desire to report all item's of income fairly. In
such a self-reporting system, transparency is paramount since the ac-
curacy of the tax earned is dependant upon the knowledge of the tax-
payers. Prior to 2000, most ordinary taxpayers were probably unaware
of the alternative tax system. 86 After the 2001-2003 tax cuts, however,
many ordinary taxpayers were now obligated to do extra calculations
in order to make sure that they did not fall under the AMT's grasp.
In addition, the inconsistencies of the AMT and regular tax system
increase the difficulties taxpayers face when trying to calculate their
respective tax liabilities. For example, "because of the inconsistency
between the AMT and regular tax systems and the failure of required
interest reporting to make any distinctions among types of interest,
some taxpayers may not understand or comply with the different
AMT treatment of various types of interest. 87
Further, the average additional tax liability for AMT taxpayers is
$6,000, which is, in many cases, much greater than liability under the
regular tax regime. 88 This sticker shock may leave taxpayers in a bind
if they did not budget tax liability in that range. Furthermore, "[a]s a
result, new AMT taxpayers may be more likely to be subject to un-
derpayment penalties."8 9 This lack of transparency in the tax system
blindsides taxpayers and understandably creates frustration. Taxpay-
ers may believe that extra calculations are an unreasonable burden
and, if they end up paying the AMT or a related penalty, that they
have been cheated without fair notice of its potential applicability. 90
Although the issue of transparency is a major concern of the AMT,
it may not by itself be adequate to justify the total repeal of the
86. See, e.g., Tax Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants: Hearing
on the Revenue Provisions in the President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 6 (1999) (statement of David A. Lifson) ("Most sophisticated
taxpayers understand that there is an alternative tax system, and that they may sometimes wind
up in its clutches; unsophisticated taxpayers, however, may never have even heard of the AMT,
certainly do not understand it, and do not expect to ever have to worry about it.").
87. Beale, supra note 2, at 853. "For example, the AMT allows a deduction for interest paid
on mortgage loans that are used to purchase a home, but it does not allow a deduction for
interest paid on home equity loans that are used for personal consumption." Id. at 853 n.166.
88. Beale, supra note 2, at 853.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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AMT.91 Lawmakers often use taxation as a tool to address economic
societal concerns. In their attempt to address one particular constitu-
ent's concerns, the effects often ripple across all the various taxation
regimes employed by the United States (e.g. payroll taxes dedicated
to Social Security and Medicare, transfer taxes governed by the gift
and estate tax regimes, and income taxes governed by the regular and
alternative tax regimes). 92 One cannot evaluate overall distributional
effects without "understanding the combined effects of all of these tax
systems, and taxpayers also need to understand how these systems in-
terrelate in order to participate in informed debate about tax pol-
icy."' 9 3 Although we would expect the average taxpayer to be familiar
with the mechanics of the regular tax system, in time they may also
become familiar with the nuances and applicability of the AMT. In-
deed, given the recent delay in passing the 2007 patch, the profile of
the AMT has been raised by the media and financial advisors resulting
in taxpayers that may not know the details of the AMT, but know well
enough to inquire about their own AMT liability.
c. Complexity
The complexity of the AMT has been noted:
The AMT is similar to a flat tax of about 28% on adjusted gross
income over $175,000 plus 26% of amounts less than $175,000 mi-
nus an exemption depending on filing status after adding back in
most deductions ($58,000 if using the standard deduction and mar-
ried filing jointly). However, taxpayers must also perform all of the
paperwork for a regular tax return and then all of the paperwork for
Form 6251. Furthermore, affected taxpayers must file AMT ver-
sions of all carryforwards since the AMT carryforwards will be dif-
ferent than regular tax carryforwards. Once a taxpayer qualifies for
AMT, he or she must file AMT versions of carryforward losses and
AMT carryforward credits until they are used up in future years.
The definitions of taxable income, deductible expenses, and exemp-
tions differ on Form 6251 from those on Form 1040.
The burden of computing the AMT and the disallowance of de-
ductions for state, local, and foreign income taxes magnify criticisms
of the AMT, at least in the case of state and local taxes. The deduc-
tion for state and local taxes in the normal income tax code can
encourage wealthy areas to raise taxes and, in effect, redirect mon-
ies that would normally go to the federal government (and hence to
residents of poorer states) to their state and local governments,
where it can be spent on their own citizens. The AMT removes this
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Beale, supra note 2, at 853.
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incentive for wealthy states to increase their state and local taxes,
and makes it more likely that citizens of areas with high costs of
living will subsidize citizens of areas with lower costs of living.
[However, t]he AMT's disallowance of the foreign tax credit has
no analogous counter-balancing effect. It continues to disadvantage
even low-paid American citizens and green card holders who work
abroad or who are otherwise paid in foreign currency. Particularly
as the dollar falls around the world, those working abroad see their
incomes (when reported to the IRS in terms of US dollars) sky-
rocket even if their actual incomes fall from year to year and even if
their foreign tax liabilities increase. They are in effect being taxed
solely on changes in the currency market, from which they have re-
ceived no benefit.94
The AMT as it existed prior to the 2001-2003 tax cuts was already a
highly complex system, requiring separate computations and careful
reading of instructions to ensure that proper adjustments had been
made.95 Now, it is more complex, requiring a four-step process:
... First, taxpayers calculate their regular income tax.
Second, [the taxpayer] determine[s] whether the AMT may apply
[to them]. Some taxpayers are automatically subject to the AMT
because the tax applies to everyone who claims certain kinds of ad-
justments to income, such as stock options not exercised in the same
year they were received. [These taxpayers go straight to the third
step.] Other taxpayers may be subject to the AMT if their taxable
income plus certain other items exceeds $45,000 for married couples
filing a joint return (half that for each spouse if they file separately),
or $33,750 for a single filer or head of household [the then-current
AMT exemption amounts]. 96
These exemption amounts are increased through yearly patches; had
the 2007 patch not been passed, taxpayers would have faced the lower
$45,000 / $33,750 exemption amounts. 97 The process continues:
... Those taxpayers [who are calculating whether the AMT applies
to them then] complete a 13-line worksheet [] provided in the in-
structions to IRS Forms 1040 and 1040A, the forms for the regular
income tax. If the worksheet indicates that the AMT may apply,
those taxpayers go on to the third step.
94. Wikipedia.org, Alternative Minimum Tax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alterna-
tiveMinimumTax (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
95. See Matthew S. Bailey, NTU Policy Paper No. 114, The Individual Alternative Minimum
Tax: No Alternative But Repeal, NAT'L TAXPAYERS UNION, April 22, 2004, at % 17, http://www.
ntu.org/main/press-papers.php?PresslD=577&org-name=NTU (quoting former IRS Commis-
sioner Rossotti's statement that the AMT is "intricate and ambiguous").
96. Beale, supra note 2, at 855 (quoting STAFF OF JoIr ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN 8 (Kurt Schuler, Comm.
Print 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tax/amt.pdf).
97. Id.
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Third, taxpayers use IRS Form 6251, which is 50 lines long, to
recalculate taxable income using the rules of the AMT instead of
the rules of the regular income tax. The result of this calculation is
called the tentative AMT.
Finally, taxpayers compare their regular tax before credits with
their tentative AMT, and pay whichever is greater. 98
Since taxpayers first must determine whether the AMT applies to
them by working through the AMT worksheet prior to filing out Form
6251, the AMT causes complexity for those who do not even face
AMT liability; the process entails additional hours of tax return prepa-
ration time and hassles.99 Although repeal of the AMT would clearly
solve this issue, it would come at the price of lost tax revenues. 100 A
simple solution, short of outright repeal, is the institution of a bright
line income threshold for AMT applicability. 101 A bright line test
would save taxpayers that do not meet the income threshold the has-
sle of figuring out whether the AMT applies to them, while simultane-
ously exempting them from the alternative tax. 102 This would also halt
any downward creep issues, thereby ensuring that the AMT remains a
tax for the high-income taxpayers. 103
If the AMT does end up being applicable to a taxpayer, that tax-
payer faces a complex set of calculation to determine their tax liabil-
ity. "Various items must be recomputed for AMT purposes, including
home mortgage interest, investment interest, depletion deductions,
and depreciation. ' 10 4 The complex requirements of the AMT lead to
wasted time, frustration and mistakes. A 1997 study "estimates that
the overall cost of compliance with the AMT may have been as high
as $360 million. ' 10 5 "The IRS estimated that the AMT system added
29 million hours to overall taxpayer return preparation time in
98. Id. at 855-56 (quoting STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE ALTERNATIVE
MINIMUM TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN 8 (Kurt Schuler, Comm. Print 2001),
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tax/amt.pdf).
99. Id. (citing DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1040 INSTRUCrIONS
2004, at 35 (2004) (providing that you should look to line 44 to see if you should fill in DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 6251: ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX - INDI-
VIDUALS (2004))).
100. Id.
101. Beale, supra note 2, at 856.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM
TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN 8 (Kurt Schuler, Comm. Print 2001), available at
http://www.house.gov/jec/tax/amt.pdf).
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2000."106 Even if these figures are discounted for possible error, they
suggest a serious problem of administrative efficiencies and complex-
ity that would benefit from AMT reform. Note that the complexity
problem may be mitigated by the fact that many high-income taxpay-
ers may already rely on tax professionals.
Overall, in light of the unfavorable cost-to-benefit ratio, many have
called for AMT reforms. The imminent explosion of AMT applicabil-
ity, the burdens imposed by the AMT's complexity, the high costs of
compliance, and the AMT's unpredictability suggest the problem the
AMT was designed to attack is sufficiently important; the AMT is not
sufficiently targeted to merit retention of the supplemental tax
system. 0 7
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Policy analysts are divided over the best course of action when it
comes to the AMT. The Tax Policy Center, a joint program of the
Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, has proposed a revenue-
neutral, highly progressive replacement for the AMT. 0 8 Len Burman
and Greg Leiserson of the Center suggest an "option [that] would re-
peal the AMT and replace it with an add-on tax of 4 percent of ad-
justed gross income above $100,000 for singles and $200,000 for
couples. The thresholds would be indexed for inflation after 2007."109
This plan, the authors contend, would share the original goal of the
AMT, that is, to ensure a certain level of taxation for high earners. 110
Some policy groups say that, rather than reform the AMT, the best
solution would be to repeal it. Among its reasons for calling for re-
peal, the Cato Institute notes: many "tax loopholes that the AMT
[was] originally designed to correct have since been closed"; the AMT
is needlessly complex and burdensome to taxpayers; and a full repeal
would leave federal revenues at 18% of GDP, which has been about
average in recent decades. 1 ' The National Taxpayers Union also sup-
106. Beale, supra note 2, at 856 (citing DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
ANNUAL REPORT FROM THE COMM'R OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE ON TAX LAW COMPLEXITY 26
(2000)).
107. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX FOR
INDIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN 8-10 (Kurt Schuler, Comm. Print 2001), available at http://
www.house.gov/jec/tax/amt.pdf.
108. Leonard E. Burman & Greg Leiserson, A Simple, Progressive Replacement for the AMT,
URBAN INSTITUTE, June 4, 2007, http://www.urban.org/publications/1001081.html.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Chris Edwards, Cato Inst. Tax and Budget Bulletin No. 40, The Alternative Minimum Tax:
Repeal Not Reform, CATO INST. (2007), http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb 0507-45.pdf.
[Vol. 6:451
THE DOWNWARD CREEP
ports repeal. "It is wholly unfair for policymakers to promote certain
social and fiscal ideas through exemptions, credits, and deductions,
only to take these incentives away when a taxpayer takes advantage of
them too well."' 112
The Tax Foundation says that the AMT can be effectively repealed
simply by correcting the deficiencies in the regular tax code. Econo-
mist Patrick Fleenor argues:
[I]t is usually the unjustifiable limitations on taxable income... that
cause the AMT backstop to kick in. If income were taxed compre-
hensively by the regular tax code, there would be no way of legally
avoiding taxation, and not one taxpayer would have to file the AMT
form even if the law were still on the books." 3
Criticism of the AMT is justified. The system is complicated both to
the taxpayer and to the Internal Revenue Service. Further, the system
can be incredibly inequitable, as in the case of contingency fees and
ISOs discussed above. However, the AMT has some merit.
The goal of recapturing those individuals with substantial economic
income who could otherwise lawfully avoid tax liability is more than
fair; it is practical and necessary. The AMT was the first substantial
attempt to sharpen the bite of a tax code worn dull and ineffective
through exclusions, deductions, and credits. To simply repeal the
AMT without substantially repairing or reforming the Code is akin to
removing the patch covering a hole in a sinking boat without further
attempting to repair the hull.
Proposals for AMT reform can be categorized generally either as
attempts to repair or to totally repeal the AMT system, both with ac-
companying reform of the regular tax system.
A. Amending the Current AMT
1. Establishment of Gross Income Threshold
It is clear the AMT was not intended to apply to ordinary taxpayers
that are not considered high-income. These taxpayers who may fall
under (or think they may fall under) the AMT should be able to ascer-
tain their exemption from the AMT without having to perform pre-
liminary worksheet calculation. The simple modification of
establishing a gross income threshold indexed to inflation would elimi-
nate the frustrating preliminary worksheet calculation from many tax-
112. Bailey, supra note 96.
113. Patrick W. Fleenor, Special Report No. 155: Fixing the Alternative Minimum Tax: AMT
Reform Requires Changes to Regular Tax Code, TAX FOUNDATION, May 17, 2007, http:/l
www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/22400.html.
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payers.' 14 "If the threshold test were not satisfied, the taxpayer would
be automatically exempt from AMT liability.""t 15
The question that naturally arises is at what income level the AMT
should be triggered. The triggering level should be high enough to
leave ordinary taxpayers clear from any AMT calculations, yet low
enough to fully capture taxpayers that would otherwise pay less than
their relative fair share. "The primary goal of the income threshold
test is to provide a convenient and easily determined line for those
who on fairness grounds should not have to worry about the
AMT."' 16
The median income per household in the country is approximately
$47,845.117 The gross income threshold for AMT applicability should
be well above that level to ensure that the AMT cannot reach into
ordinary taxpayer ranks. As previously mentioned, without the 2007
patch, the AMT exemption amounts would have fallen to $45,000 for
joint filers and $33,750 for single filers, clearly below the median in-
come level of the United States.11 8 Certainly the AMT, which was first
envisioned to tax superrich citizens avoiding tax liability, was not in-
tended to reach these ordinary taxpayers. One source suggests a feasi-
ble income threshold might exempt married taxpayers with gross
incomes of less than $150,000 (in 2004 dollars) and other taxpayers
with incomes of less than $75,000.119 Whatever sum is proposed, all
can agree that although less tax revenue will be generated with the
establishment of a gross income threshold, the AMT will be become
more congruent with the purpose of the original alternative tax.
114. Beale, supra note 2, at 878.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS No. P60-233, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH IN-
SURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 5 tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf.
118. Sahadi, supra note 5.
119. Beale, supra note 2, at 879. Beale further asserted:
It is difficult to determine the cost of this change, but the National Taxpayer Advocates
notes that use of a $150,000 threshold would have eliminated about 40% of taxpayers in
2001 who paid approximately $800 million in AMT.... Lowering the threshold could
lower the cost of reform, but the threshold probably should not drop below $100,000
for married taxpayers filing jointly and $50,000 for others (i.e., approximately twice the
median earnings for single individuals).
Id. at 879 n.252.
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2. Indexing the AMT to Inflation
Even proponents of the current AMT cite the lack of indexation of
the AMT exemption as one of the most significant problems.120 Index-
ation is essential in preventing future downward creep of the AMT
into ordinary taxpayer brackets and countering the lack of trans-
parency for individual taxpayers who are unaware of the potential ap-
plicability of the AMT. "Some studies (based on indexing the existing
AMT exemption amount, without an income threshold) have sug-
gested that indexing alone could cost as much as $658 billion over ten
years." 121
Related to the gross income threshold is the idea that the AMT
exemption amount also could be indexed for inflation. Additionally,
limitations on deductions that most directly impact the middle class
could be eliminated completely.122 Examples of such limitations in-
clude taxes deductible on Schedule A,123 interest on home equity in-
debtedness, miscellaneous deductions that survive the two percent
floor under the regular tax, 124 and the deduction for personal and de-
pendency exemptions. 125 Finally, the AMT tax brackets could be im-
proved further by also adding additional brackets.' 26
All of these changes would improve the equity of the AMT by in-
creasing progressivity and removing a considerable amount of the
AMT burden that now rests on the middle class.' 27 Eliminating cer-
tain limitations on deductions would also improve equity by decreas-
ing the federal tax liability of taxpayers with higher state tax liability.
Economic and administrative efficiency would remain constant, or
minimally increase, because Congress would no longer need to pass
periodic adjustments to the AMT.
120. See, e.g., Mark A. Luscombe, TAX TRENDS - Alternative Minimum Tax - Our Future
Flat Tax?, CCH J., TAXES, Nov. 2003, at 4 ("It is hard to get too excited about an AMT problem
when the AMT has largely achieved its purpose but has a principal defect of not having been
adjusted for inflation. We just start adjusting it for inflation, and the problem goes away.").
121. Beale, supra note 2, at 882.
122. Daniel S. Goldberg, To Praise the AMT or to Bury It, 24 Va. Tax Rev 835, 841 (2005).
123. State and local taxes. I.R.C. § 164(a) (2006).
124. Id. § 67.
125. Goldberg, supra note 130, at 841.
126. The AMT has only two tax brackets, while the regular tax system currently has six
brackets.
127. See Leonard E. Burman et al., The Individual AMT: Problems and Potential Solutions,
NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Sept. 2002 (relating specific economic outcomes to several proposals
to reform the AMT, including indexing the AMT. In one model, the Urban-Brookings Tax Pol-
icy Center found that indexing the AMT tax brackets, exemptions, and threshold for the exemp-
tion phase-outs for inflation would result in 94 percent relief of AMT liability among taxpayers
with annual incomes between $15,000 and $75,000.).
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3. Elimination of Second Depreciation Schedule
Another simple attempt to repair the AMT may involve the elimi-
nation of the second set of depreciation calculations currently re-
quired to determine AMT tax liability.128 The elimination of a second
set of books for every depreciable asset would greatly increase the
economic efficiency of the AMT. 129 Economic efficiency would bring
further administrative efficiency, like fewer and shorter audits. How-
ever, inequities would remain, and this change alone would do noth-
ing to alleviate much of the instability of the current AMT.
B. Adopting Prior Schemes
1. Reenactment of the Pre-1986 Add-on Minimum Tax
If the sum of tax preferences exceeded an amount that would be
designated in the Code, the Internal Revenue Service could again as-
sess an add-on tax to the taxpayer's regular tax owed. This would
eliminate the parallel tax system and much of the complexity it cre-
ates. 130 This solution would preserve the AMT's foundational goal of
including those taxpayers who have both substantial economic income
and little or no tax liability under the regular system. The most obvi-
ous criticism would be that an add-on minimum tax has already been
tried and was viewed as a failure. 131
2. Reenactment of the Original 1969 Minimum Tax Proposal
The minimum tax, as originally proposed, would limit the amount of
tax preferences a taxpayer could claim each year. 132 For example, the
Internal Revenue Service could limit preferences to a percentage of
the taxpayer's tax liability. Such a minimum tax would make sense if
viewed through the classical framework outlined above. 133 Equity
would be assured as the limit on preferences would be a percentage
rather than a dollar amount assigned to tax brackets. Stability would
be less of a concern as the limitation would not need an adjustment
for inflation. The tax itself would only change as tax preferences were
added to the Code. Finally, the simplicity of such a single tax system
would increase economic and administrative efficiency.
128. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 77.
129. Id.
130. Karlinsky, supra note 20, at 153.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
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C. Harmonize the Regular and AMT Tax Systems
Another "middle of the road" approach to reform may be the har-
monization of the current AMT tax with the regular tax system. This
solution may be the most cost effective and legislatively simple
method of improving the current hodgepodge of taxation.
1. Treatment of Phase-outs for Exemptions and
Itemized Deductions 34
A modest regular tax reform that is consistent with the proposals
for reform of the AMT is the reinstatement of the regular tax phase-
outs for exemptions and itemized deductions. For example, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code currently provides for a reduction in the total
amount of permitted itemized deductions, by the lesser of 3% of the
excess of adjusted gross income over $145,950 (for 2005) or 80% of
the itemized deductions otherwise allowable. 135 Reinstating these
phase-outs would offset some of the cost of AMT reforms and at the
same time improve consistency and remove complexity caused by the
conflicts between the regular and AMT system when one system has a
phaseout and the other does not. Phase-outs take into account the
decreasing marginal utility of each dollar to high-income taxpayers.
Retaining phase-outs ensures that the benefits of exemptions and de-
ductions accrue to those who have the most need for them and pro-
vide further assurance that higher-income taxpayers cannot avoid all
taxes on their economic income.
2. Harmonization of Medical Expense Deductions 36
The current penalizing approach of limiting medical expenses for
AMT purposes is exceedingly problematic for taxpayers. It would be
far better for tax administrators to carefully review provisions for the
deductibility of medical expenses under the regular tax system in or-
der to restrict further the ability of wealthy taxpayers to deduct items
that may be more personal than medically necessary. Regardless, if
medical expenses are deductible for purposes of the regular tax sys-
tem, they should be deductible for the AMT system. This is one area
where anything other than consistency between the two systems ap-
pears senseless.
134. See generally Beale, supra note 2.
135. I.R.C. § 68(a) (2006).
136. See generally Beale, supra note 2.
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3. Additional Harmonizing Changes 137
Several of the current AMT preferences might be eliminated
through harmonization of those items with the regular income tax by
eliminating them as an AMT preference or by shifting the regular tax
to the AMT approach. The result would be consistency between the
AMT and regular tax, and lessened complexity for both systems.
Items that might be most appropriate, though most likely difficult to
change due to public and political pressures, include the mortgage in-
terest deduction for home equity loans, a limitation on interest deduc-
tions on acquisition indebtedness, and accelerated cost recovery
deductions that currently require recomputation for AMT purposes.
The regular income tax deduction for home equity loans runs
against the stated purpose for mortgage interest deductions of ex-
tending home ownership to ordinary Americans. It introduces a
wealth-based distinction that disadvantages the less wealthy since it
permits existing home owners to deduct borrowing costs for personal
consumption expenses that are not deductible to non-home owners.
Eliminating the home equity loan interest deduction in the regular tax
would make the AMT and regular tax more consistent and simpler. In
addition, limitation of the acquisition debt interest deduction to inter-
est payments on mortgages under a reasonable threshold that is more
proportionate with home purchases by ordinary taxpayers, and elimi-
nation of any interest deduction for mortgages on non-principal resi-
dences would further return the mortgage interest deduction to its
original purpose.
Similarly, the simplified cost recovery deductions could be adopted
for both AMT and regular income tax systems. Accelerated deprecia-
tion rewards capital investments that flourish without such incentives,
and it encourages over-investment in unproductive endeavors. Reduc-
ing the recovery options simplifies both systems.
D. Total Repeal of the AMT1 38
The AMT, although of questionable effectiveness, is the result of a
continuing effort to provide equity in a tax system that may otherwise
be avoided by those with the means to acquire effective tax counsel.
For that reason, assuming arguendo that the AMT were repealed, the
equitable aspects of its function would need to be transferred to the
regular tax system. The easiest method for accomplishing this would
137. See generally O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14.
138. See generally Burman et al., supra note 4.
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be to incorporate the equitable AMT provisions and limitations into
the regular tax code.
While, many in Congress are likely weary to the idea of such aggres-
sive reform, eliminating the AMT would require Congress and advi-
sors from the Treasury Department to analyze the AMT item by item
and incorporate the desirable AMT provisions into the regular tax
code. The decision to cull certain tax preferences over others is likely
to become a political quagmire. However, Congress must address the
fact that certain tax preferences, particularly those created to en-
courage specific taxpayer behavior, contribute to inequities in tax lia-
bility and erode the tax base. If Congress takes action to phase out the
AMT, it must do so quickly, as the cost of its repeal will soon be pro-
hibitively expensive. Outright repeal is estimated to cost between one
and two trillion dollars over 10 years. 139
Collapsing those AMT provisions and limitations most favorable to
equity into the regular tax system will require considerable effort and
discussion. If carried over into the regular tax system, many AMT lim-
itations on deductions must be either indexed for inflation or elimi-
nated so as to achieve greater equity among taxpayers.
If the limitations and deductions incorporated by the regular tax
system are indexed for inflation, stability issues would be generally
resolved. Additionally, the economic efficiency of a merged system
surpasses the current AMT, most obviously because of the elimination
of an entire tax system. The Internal Revenue Service would no
longer require the taxpayer to recalculate income or maintain two sets
of books for depreciation. High income taxpayers still would need to
understand their limitations, but the Internal Revenue Service would
not require them to understand an alternate system of taxation.
Economic efficiency would translate into greater compliance and
fewer taxpayer errors. This would greatly increase administrative effi-
ciency. Additionally, a single tax system would reduce the resources
needed to educate the public and tax employees.
V. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
No fewer than a dozen bills on the subject of AMT reform have
been introduced and considered by the House of Representatives dur-
ing 109th Congress; many more are being considered by the current
139. Jeanne Sahadi, The 44th President's $4 Trillion Headache, CNNMONEY, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/22/news/economy/candidates-deficit/?postversion=2008022214.
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110th Congress. 140 Current legislative proposals are as varied as those
suggested above.
Several bills suggest adjusting the AMT exemption amount. 141 Re-
ferred to as patches, these exemption adjustments do very little to al-
leviate the long term AMT dilemma. Since 2001, Congress
temporarily increased income exemption levels and allowed some per-
sonal credits to be used. The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2005, enacted in May 2006, raised the exemption amount
for joint and single returns to $62,550 and $42,500, respectively. 142 Un-
less Congress enacts a similar bill allowing for greater exemptions in
every new tax year, the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation
Act of 2005 will not fix the AMT. The Act also sets a bad example. It
allows Congress to draft one-year fixes, avoiding its responsibility of
enacting long-term solutions.
At the last minute, Congress passed the 2007 patch, without which
the 2007 exemption amounts would have fallen to $45,000 for joint
filers and $33,750 for single filers.' 43 Demonstrative of the confusion
and never-ending debate regarding the AMT, the patch was passed on
December 20, 2007, but only after the IRS had already designed its
forms for 2007.144 The IRS had to reprogram its forms to accommo-
date the law change, creating potential delays in income tax refunds
for 2007.
Despite the 2007 patch, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
that 5.4 million tax filers were likely subject to the AMT in 2007, up
from around 4 million last year.145
The Stealth Tax Relief Act of 2005 and House Bill 1599 additionally
address the AMT exemption amounts provided under Internal Reve-
nue Code Section 55(d). 146 The Stealth Tax Relief Act of 2005 and
House Bill 1599, however, would index the exemption amounts for
140. H.R. 5590, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 5176, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 4873, 109th Cong.
(2006); H.R. 4297, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); H.R. 4096, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2987,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2950, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1599, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1538,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1500, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1186, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1040,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 703, 109th Cong. (2005).
141. H.R. 5590; H.R. 4297; H.R. 1538.
142. H.R. 4297 § 301(a) (enacted) (showing that previous AMT exemption amounts were
$58,000 for joint returns and $40,250 for single taxpayers); I.R.C. § 55(d).
143. Sahadi, supra note 5.
144. Retire On Less, Alternative Minimum Tax Patched on 12/20/07, RETIREONLESS.COM, Dec.
27, 2007, http://retireonless.com/2007/12/27/alternative-minimum-tax-patched-on-122007/.
145. Jeanne Sahadi, AMT Penalty: The Ultimate Insult, CNNMONEY, June 28, 2007, http://
money.cnn.com/2007/06/27/pf/taxes/amt-penalty/index.htm.
146. H.R. 4096, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 5590, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (stating that the Stealth
Tax Relief Extension Act of 2006 would raise the exemption amount for joint and single returns
to $66,100 and $44,900, respectively).
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inflation. In contrast to the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2005, this proposal would provide longer lasting relief to
taxpayers with similar regular income tax and AMT liabilities by pro-
viding the extra AMT exemption amount to reduce their tentative
AMT; this would effectively eliminate their AMT liability. Because
this proposal only adjusts the AMT exemption amount, it has the po-
litical advantage of appearing to benefit the middle class while retain-
ing the steep AMT tax brackets that are beneficial to the wealthy.
However, these bills would only preserve the status quo. As the
AMT already captures too much of the middle class, indexing the
AMT exemption amount for inflation provides relief only to those
who would otherwise pay the AMT in the near future. It does nothing
to help those already paying the AMT. A proposal would be more
vertically equitable and preserve the progressivity of the regular tax
system if it increased the AMT exemption amounts before indexing
them for inflation.
Both House Bill 2987 and the AMT Middle Class Fairness Act of
2005 add certain deductions back into the AMT.147 The two bills
would allow deductions for state and local taxes, but the AMT Middle
Class Fairness Act of 2005 differs from House Bill 2987 by addition-
ally adjusting the AMT exemption amount for inflation.148 These two
bills could increase horizontal equity under the AMT by ensuring that
taxpayers would not be punished for choosing to live in a locality with
higher taxes.
The Fair Flat Tax Act of 2006 and Freedom Flat Tax Act both pro-
pose wholesale overhaul of the regular income tax system and elimi-
nation of the AMT. 149 The Fair Flat Tax Act of 2006, contrary to its
name, would establish three tax brackets. 150 The Act's most attractive
feature is its attempt to broaden the tax base, thus eliminating the
need for the AMT. The Freedom Flat Tax Act would allow the tax-
payer to continue paying his current income tax or to make a one-time
election to be liable for a flat tax under which the AMT would be
abolished.151 Similar to the Fair Flat Tax Act of 2006, the Freedom
Flat Tax Act would broaden the tax base by providing fewer deduc-
tions and exemptions than the current Code.152 The broader tax base
would help eliminate the need for the AMT in two ways: (1) it would
147. H.R. 2987, 109th Cong. § 1(a) (2005); H.R. 703, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
148. H.R. 703 § 2(b).
149. H.R. 1040, 109th Cong. §§ 2, 60 (2005).
150. Id. § 2.
151. Id. §§ 2, 60.
152. Id. § 60.
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replace tax revenues lost through AMT repeal, and (2) fix loopholes
or inequities in the Code that provided the original impetus for enact-
ment of the AMT.
The Individual Tax Simplification Act of 2005 is another attempt to
eliminate the AMT while offsetting lost tax revenues by reforming the
regular tax system. This bill suggests a fairly simple minimum tax that
would be based upon the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.' 53 The
proposed minimum tax would have much greater administrative effi-
ciency than the current AMT because the minimum tax in the Individ-
ual Tax Simplification Act of 2005 is more easily calculated and
understood than the AMT. The Individual Tax Simplification Act of
2005's greatest problem lies in its failure to change the inclusion of
ISOs as gross income, a major source of contention under the current
AMT.
Most recently, on October 25, 2007, Rep. Charles Rangel, Chair-
man of the House Committee on Ways and Means, introduced a bill
that would repeal the AMT (the "Tax Reduction and Reform Act of
2007"). 154 He proposed to substitute the estimated $800 billion in lost
revenue over ten years with a "replacement tax," a surtax that would
kick in for couples with incomes more than $200,000 and singles mak-
ing at least $150,000.155 This 4% surtax would rise to 4.6% on incomes
more than $500,000, and would increase taxes an estimated 1.7 million
households (mostly those with AGI of more than $500,000) according
to an analysis by the Joint Committee on Taxation, the source of Con-
gress's official tax estimates. 156 "Those 1.7 million households would
pay $71.1 billion in additional taxes.... The highest increase would hit
about 400,000 households with incomes of one million dollars or
more."
157
153. H.R. 2950, 109th Cong. § 311 (2005) (explaining that if the adjusted gross income of an
individual exceeds the initial threshold amount defined in the Individual Tax Simplification Act
of 2005, the taxpayer's income would be increased by an amount equal to the sum of "the appli-
cable rate of so much of the adjusted gross income as exceeds the initial threshold amount but
does not exceed the second threshold amount, and twice the applicable rate of so much of the
adjusted gross income as exceeds the second threshold amount." The applicable rate would be
"the rate estimated by the Secretary which will result in the Individual Tax Simplification Act of
2005 being revenue neutral over the first 10 years after its enactment.").
154. Sarah Lueck, Politics & Economics: How Rangel Aims to Pay for AMT Cut, WALL ST. J.,
October 27, 2007, at A4.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. These taxpayers would pay $55.4 billion in additional taxes in 2008.
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Conversely, 91 million households would see tax reductions under
the Rangel Plan, most with incomes below $100,000.158 The $55 billion
reduction in 2008 would go to households with incomes between one
hundred thousand dollars and five hundred thousand dollars, a group
that includes many people who would otherwise have to pay AMT. 159
Rangel argues "[f]undamental tax reform must begin with a repeal
of [the AMT] now hitting middle-class families and is threatening to
grab back the benefits promised under the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. '160
Rangel claimed that his plan meets the Bush administration's call for a
permanent repeal of the AMT while remaining revenue neutral. 161
The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007 would repeal the AMT,
thereby eliminating the complexity of filing multiple forms. The de-
creased confusion would allow for more efficient tax planning.
Although the plan was bold, Congress opted for the traditional and
simpler solution of passing a patch for 2007.162 Further, Republican
law makers see the 2007 incarnation of the patch as a victory since the
bill is not revenue-neutral and the $53 billion revenue shortfall will
not be addressed as Democratic leaders hoped. 63
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently, the Alternative Minimum Tax's profile has been raised
from an obscure section of tax code to an often criticized policy that
threatens difficulty for many ordinary Americans. Repeal of the AMT
has even become a campaign pledge in this Presidential election year.
Republican nominee John McCain stated, "I would call for the elimi-
nation of the AMT. '' 164
In 2007, approximately 23 million households may face the AMT,
about 19 million of them for the first time.165
Since the AMT thresholds were not initially indexed to inflation,
Congress has been forced to pass a series of temporary stopgaps to
ensure that the AMT didn't encroach on the growing number of tax-
158. Sarah Lueck, Politics & Economics: How Rangel Aims to Pay for AMT Cut, WALL ST. J.,
October 27, 2007, at A4.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Charles Rangel).
161. Id.
162. Sahadi, supra note 39.
163. Id.
164. John McCain, 'I'm Always for Less Regulation': McCain's Economic Thinking, WALL ST.
J., March 3, 2008, at A14.
165. Sahadi, supra note 5.
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payers for whom it was never intended. 66 Despite the 2007 patch, the
Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that 5.4 million tax filers are
likely subject to the AMT in 2007, up from around four million last
year.167
If reform of the AMT is to be successful, its cost must be offset
without simply shifting the tax burden to ordinary taxpayers (or by
cutting spending). To maximize structural coherence and consistency
between the AMT and regular tax system, the costs should be met by
increasing AMT collections from higher-income individuals, by in-
creasing regular tax collections from higher-income individuals, or by
some combination thereof. Congress did not intend to impose the
AMT on the middle class, and steps must be taken to halt its en-
croachment before it any further damage is sustained.
166. William J. Watts, Rangel: Timing Uncertain on 'Mother of All Tax Reforms,'
MARKETWATCH, Oct. 17. 2007.
167. Id.
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